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Abstract In the paper expected utility from consumption over finite time horizon for
discrete time markets with bid and ask prices and strictly concave utility function is
considered. The notion of weak shadow price, i.e. an illiquid price, depending on the
portfolio, under which the model without bid and ask price is equivalent to the model
with bid and ask price is introduced. Existence and the form of weak shadow price is
shown. Using weak shadow price usual (called in the paper strong) shadow price is
then constructed.
Keywords Bellman equations · Transaction costs · Portfolio optimization ·
Shadow price · Utility maximization
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study the problem of maximization of expected utility in the discrete
time market with finite horizon and with transaction costs. We introduce the so called
weak shadow price, i.e. a portfolio state dependent price process taking values between
the bid and ask prices for which optimal value of expected utility in this frictionless
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market is the same as in themarket with transaction costs.With the use ofweak shadow
price we construct shadow price, called in the paper strong shadow price, which is a
sequence of random variables, playing the role of asset prices, taking values between
bid and ask prices, depending on initial portfolio position, such that the optimal value
of expected utility in the market with these asset prices is the same as in the market
with transaction costs.
The problem of existence and construction of shadow price has been first studied
for the Black–Scholes model with transaction costs and discounted logarithmic utility
function (see [9,10,15]). Then existence of shadow price was shown for discrete time
finite market in [16]. It appears that in some cases we are not able to find a frictionless
market with price process taking values between bid and ask prices which gives the
same optimal strategy as the market with transaction costs (see [2] and [6]).
In this paper we study general discrete time finite horizon problem with strictly
concave utility function. We consider so called weak shadow price, i.e. a price system
in an illiquid frictionless market, depending on our portfolio, for which optimal value
of the expected utility (and thus also the optimal strategies) coincides with value of
optimal expected utility in the market with transaction costs. This price system is not
a shadow price in the sense considered in [15] or in [16]. This is in fact a more general
notion, which enables us to construct later strong shadow price studied in [15] or in
[16]. Furthermore under our assumptions for power and logarithmic utilities strong
and weak shadow prices are uniquely defined.
The method used in this paper is significantly different from those considered in
the other papers (see [1,2,5,6,9,10,13,15,16,19]). Because of discrete time we don’t
have differential structure of the model as in [15]. We also do not use Lagrange
method studied in [16]. Our method is based on strict concavity of utility function,
which results in uniqueness and continuity of optimal strategies. We are also using
a number of geometric properties of selling, buying and non transaction zones. The
main construction of weak shadow price is based on the Merton’s proportion, i.e. the
optimal proportion between the value of stocks and the wealth.
We assume that on a probability space (,F ,P) with filtration (Fn)Nn=0 we are
given a strictly positive adapted processes S = (Sn)Nn=0 and S = (Sn)Nn=0 such that
Sn > Sn for n = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N satisfying the following version of conditional full
support condition (CFS) almost surely
conv
(
supp E[(SN−k, . . . , SN )|FN−k]
) = {SN−k} × [0,∞)k,
conv
(
supp E[(SN−k, . . . , SN )|FN−k]
) = {SN−k} × [0,∞)k (1.1)
for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N , where conv stands for convex hull and supp is the support of
the random vector. This condition is similar to the condition (CFS) considered in [11].
Assume we are given a marketM in which we have a safe bank account and a risky
stock account with infinitely divisible assets. The interest rate on the bank account for
simplicity is equal to 0. At time moment n = 0, 1, . . . , N we can buy or sell stocks
paying Sn or getting Sn respectively. In the paper we assume that every conditional
expected value is of a regular version, the existence of which is guaranteed by Theorem
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3.1 in [12]. We shall also use the convention that E(−∞|G) := −∞ for any σ -field
G ⊆ F .
Our financial position will be denoted by the pair (x, y), where x is the amount
on the bank account and y is the number of assets in our portfolio. Given a position
(x, y) at a fixed time moment we are allowed to trade stocks just in such way that we
are not allowed to bankrupt. Taking into account the fact that the random variables
Sn and Sn , which represent the bid and ask prices of the stocks, are fully supported
(see [11]), we are allowed to make an investment policy only in such a way that at
next time moment the amount on bank and stock accounts will be nonnegative almost
surely. Consequently, this way we have short selling and short buying constraints.








over all u from the set of admissible strategies U(x,y)(S, S) which are defined in Sect.
2, with a constant discount factor γ ∈ (0, 1], where our initial position (x0, y0) =
(x, y) ∈ R2+ is such that x + y > 0 and cn is our consumption at time moment
n = 0, 1, . . . , N , S0 = s, S0 = s and g is a utility function that is a strictly increasing,
strictly concave function defined on (0,∞) with g(0) finite or g(0) = −∞. We shall
also assume that g(u) = −∞ for u < 0. The class of such utility functions contains
in particular g(c) = ln c, g(c) = cα with α ∈ (0, 1) or g(c) = 1 − e−c.
We assume that the processes S and S are such that assumption (A1) (see Sect. 3),
which guarantees integrability of certain finite horizon value functions, is satisfied.
We will introduce a notion of weak shadow price, i.e. a price system
Sˆ = {Sˆn(x, y, s, s) : n = 0, 1, . . . , N , (x, y, s, s) ∈ D}
where
D := {(x, y, s, s) ∈ R4+ : s > s > 0}, (1.3)
such that n = 0, 1, . . . , N :
Sn ≤ Sˆn(x, y, Sn, Sn) ≤ Sn
the random variable Sˆn(x, y, Sn, Sn) is Fn-measurable for (x, y) ∈ R2+ \ {(0, 0)} and
the optimal expected value of discounted utility function (1.2) for the market with
price system Sˆ is the same as in the market M. More precisely, in this shadow market
the current price of a unit of the stock depends on our position at the beginning of this
period. In other words, we translate the problem of maximization of (1.2) in the liquid
market with transaction costs to the problem of maximization (1.2) in a frictionless
illiquid market with price system Sˆ.
Then we construct shadow price (strong shadow price): a sequence of random
variables, depending on initial position, taking values between bid and ask prices such
that optimal values of the cost functional (1.2) for market with shadow price is the
same as for the market with transaction costs.
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The problem of construction of weak and then strong shadow prices for the func-
tional (1.2) is solved for every price processes S and S satisfying (1.1) and (A1). What
is important we do not impose any additional conditions (besides of (1.1) and (A1))
for the processes S and S and we study the case with general strictly concave utility
function.
2 Properties of the Set of Constraints
In this section we introduce the notion of constraints on admissible strategies. Gener-
ally speaking, the strategies are admissible if they are adapted to filtration (Fn)Nn=0 and
they do not lead to bankruptcy almost surely. Note that because of the conditionally
full support condition (1.1), after possible transaction we should have nonnegative
position in bank and stock accounts, since otherwise with positive probability our
wealth in the next time moment could be strictly negative.
For (x, y, s, s) ∈ D with D defined in (1.3) let
A(x, y, s, s) := {(c, l,m) ∈ [0, x + sy] × R2+ :
∀s∈[0,∞) x − c + sm − sl + s(y − m + l) ≥ 0}. (2.1)
Equivalently we have
A(x, y, s, s) = {(c, l,m) ∈ [0, x + sy] × R2+ :
x − c + sm − sl ≥ 0, y − m + l ≥ 0}. (2.2)
The set A(x, y, s, s) consists of one step consumption, buying and selling strategies
we are allowed to use starting from the position (x, y).We summarize below important
properties of this set.
Proposition 2.1 Let (x, y, s, s) ∈ D. Then we have
(i) A(ρx, ρy, s, s) = ρA(x, y, s, s), for ρ ≥ 0,
(ii) the set A(x, y, s, s) is convex,
(iii) for s > s > 0 the set A(x, y, s, s) is compact,
(iv) for s > s > 0 the following implications hold
(0, lˆ, 0) ∈ A(x, y, s, s) ⇒ ∀l∈[0,lˆ] (0, lˆ − l, 0) ∈ A(x − sl, y + l, s, s), (2.3)
(0, 0, mˆ) ∈ A(x, y, s, s) ⇒ ∀m∈[0,mˆ] (0, 0, mˆ − m) ∈ A(x + sm, y + m, s, s),
(2.4)
(c, l,m) ∈ A(x, y, s, s) ⇒ ∀ρ∈[0,1] (ρc, ρl, ρm) ∈ A(x, y, s, s), (2.5)
and
(c, l,m) ∈ R3+ \ A(x, y, s, s) ⇒ ∀ρ≥1 (ρc, ρl, ρm) /∈ A(x, y, s, s), (2.6)
123
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(v) for (x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ R2+, s, s ∈ R+ such that s > s > 0 and all t ∈ [0, 1] the
following inclusion holds
tA(x1, y1, s, s) + (1 − t)A(x2, y2, s, s)
⊆ A(t x1 + (1 − t)x2, t y1 + (1 − t)y2, s, s), (2.7)
(vi) for (x1, y1, s1, s1), (x2, y2, s2, s2) ∈ D if x1 ≤ x2, y1 ≤ y2, s1 ≤ s2 and s1 ≥
s2, we have A(x1, y1, s1, s1) ⊆ A(x2, y2, s2, s2),
(vii) if sequence (xn, yn, sn, sn) ∈ D converges to (x0, y0, s0, s0) ∈ D then the set
cl(A(x0, y0, s0, s0)∪∪∞n=1A(xn, yn, sn, sn)), is compact, where cl stands for the
closure.
The proof is in Appendix.
Denote by h the Hausdorff metric defined on the space H(R3+) of compact subsets
of R3+ as follows
h(A, B) := max{d(A, B), d(B, A)}
with d(A, B) := sup{dist (a, B) : a ∈ A} and dist (x, A) := inf{d(x, a) : a ∈ A}.
Clearly (H(R3+), h) is a complete metric space (see e.g. [4]). We have
Theorem 2.1 Let (xn, yn, sn, sn)
∞
n=1 be a sequence from D, which converges to
(x, y, s, s) ∈ D. Then
h(A(x, y, s, s),A(xn, yn, sn, sn))
n→∞−−−→ 0. (2.8)
The proof is in Appendix.
3 Bellman Equations
Following Theorem 1 of [8] we introduce now a system of Bellman equations. For
(x, y, s, s) ∈ D let
wN (x, y, s, s) := g(x + sy). (3.1)
The function wN is continuous and concave. For (x, y, s, s) ∈ D and (c, l,m) ∈
A(x, y, s, s) let
VN−1(x, y, s, s, c, l,m) :=
g(c) + γwN (x − c + sm − sl, y − m + l, SN , SN ). (3.2)
It is obvious that the random function VN−1 is continuous in its domain for ω ∈ .
Assuming tacitly integrability of VN−1 (with respect to ω) from Theorem I.3.1 of
[12] (see also [18]) there exists a regular conditional probability
{pN−1(ω, A)}ω∈,A∈FN−1
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VN−1(x, y, s, s, c, l,m)(ω′)pN−1(ω, dω′) (3.3)
is well defined for ω ∈  and
∫

VN−1(x, y, s, s, c, l,m)(ω′)pN−1(ω, dω′) =
E[VN−1(x, y, s, s, c, l,m)|FN−1](ω) (3.4)
for P-almost all ω ∈ .
In other words, the mapping defined in (3.3) is a version of conditional expected
value of VN−1(x, y, s, s, c, l,m) givenFN−1 and as wementioned in the Introduction
in what follows we shall consider only such versions of conditional expected value.
For (x, y, s, s) ∈ D let
wN−1(x, y, s, s) := sup
(c,l,m)∈A(x,y,s,s)
E[VN−1(x, y, s, s, c, l,m)|FN−1] (3.5)
and define inductively
VN−k(x, y, s, s, c, l,m) := g(c)+
γwN−k+1(x − c + sm − sl, y − m + l, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)
and
wN−k(x, y, s, s) := sup
(c,l,m)∈A(x,y,s,s)
E[VN−k(x, y, s, s, c, l,m)|FN−k], (3.6)
for k = 1, 2, . . . , N . By Theorem 1 of [8] we know that optimal control problem with
gain functional (1.2) is solved using a sequence of Bellman equations (3.6) introduced
above. In what follows we shall assume that
(A1) bid and ask prices S = (Sn)Nn=0 and S = (Sn)Nn=0 are such that:
∀(x,y)∈R2+\{(0,0)} we have integrability of wi (x, y, Si , Si ) (with respect to ω)
and Eg(x + Si y)− < ∞ as well as ∀(x,y,s,s)∈D Ewi (x, y, s, s) < ∞ for
i = 1, 2, . . . , N .
We have
Proposition 3.1 Under (A1) for s > s > 0 and k = 1, 2, . . . , N the random map-
pings
(x, y) −→ wN−k(x, y, s, s)
and
(x, y, c, l,m) −→ E[VN−k(x, y, s, s, c, l,m)|FN−k]
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(considered as regular conditional expected value) with (x, y) ∈ R2+ \ {(0, 0)) and
(c, l,m) ∈ A(x, y, s, s) are well defined continuous FN−k-measurable random func-
tions.
The proof by induction is postponed to the Appendix.
In Lemma 10.1 in the Appendix we impose some sufficient conditions for processes
(Sn)
N
n=0 and (Sn)Nn=0 under which assumption (A1) is satisfied.
Basing on continuity results of Proposition 3.1 we obtain existence of selectors in
Bellman equations (3.6).
Lemma 3.1 Let (x, y, s, s) ∈ D. Then there exists an FN−k-measurable random
variable (cˆ, lˆ, mˆ) which takes values in the set A(x, y, s, s) such that for ω ∈  we
have
wN−k(x, y, s, s)(ω) = E[g(cˆ(ω)) + γwN−k+1(x − cˆ(ω) + smˆ(ω) − slˆ(ω),
y − mˆ(ω) + lˆ(ω), SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k](ω). (3.7)
The proof is in Appendix.
Remark 3.1 Notice that in the Lemma 3.1 thanks to the suitable continuity we have
a nice result on the existence of measurable selectors without necessity to use more
general results of [8] or Theorem B of section 6 in chapter 2 of [7]. See also [17].
For (x, y, s, s) ∈ D denote by AN−k(x, y, s, s) the set of all FN−k-measurable
random variables taking values in the set A(x, y, s, s).
Corollary 3.1 Let (x, y, s, s) ∈ D. Then
wN−k(x, y, s, s) = sup
(c∗,l∗,m∗)∈AN−k (x,y,s,s)
E[VN−k(x, y, s, s, c∗, l∗,m∗)|FN−k].
(3.8)
The meaning of (3.8) is very important, because it says that dealing with Bellman
equationwN−k wecan look at not only the deterministic set of triples fromA(x, y, s, s)
but we can deal with FN−k-measurable random variables which take values in this
set.
We also have
Corollary 3.2 Let (x, y, s, s) ∈ D. Let (cˆ, lˆ, mˆ) ∈ AN−k(x, y, s, s) be such that
wN−k(x, y, s, s) = E[VN−k(x, y, s, s, cˆ, lˆ, mˆ)|FN−k].
Then for every random variable (c˜, l˜, m˜) from AN−k(x, y, s, s) we have
E[VN−k(x, y, s, s, cˆ, lˆ, mˆ)|FN−k] ≥ E[VN−k(x, y, s, s, c˜, l˜, m˜)|FN−k].
Now we will define the set U(x,y)(S, S) of all admissible strategies in the market
with transaction costs and with the initial position (x, y) ∈ R2+. A sequence u =
123
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(un)Nn=0 = (cn, ln,mn)Nn=0 is called an admissible strategy if for n = 0, 1, . . . , N the
triple (cn, ln,mn) ∈ An(xn, yn, Sn, Sn), where the sequences (xn)Nn=0 and (yn)Nn=0




(x0, y0) := (x, y)
xn+1 := xn − cn + Snmn − Snln for n = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1
yn+1 := yn − mn + ln for n = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1
. (3.9)
Note that any admissible strategy u ∈ U(x,y)(S, S) defines by (3.9) a unique pre-
dictable sequence (xn, yn)Nn=0. Thus writing u ∈ U(x,y)(S, S) we may think that
u = (cn, ln,mn, xn, yn)Nn=0.
We have
Proposition 3.2 Let uˆ = (cˆn, lˆn, mˆn)Nn=0 be a sequence of admissible strategies such
that for the corresponding sequence of market positions (xˆn, yˆn) defined by (3.9) and
k = 1, 2, 3, . . . , N the following equalities hold
wN−k(xˆN−k−1, yˆN−k−1, SN−k+1, SN−k+1) =
E[VN−k(xˆN−k−1, yˆN−k−1, SN−k, SN−k, cˆN−k, lˆN−k, mˆN−k)|FN−k]. (3.10)
Then we have
E[w0(x, y, s, s)] = sup
u∈U(x,y)(S,S)
J(u) = J(uˆ). (3.11)
with S0 = s and S0 = s.
Proof It is obvious that in (3.11) we have “≤”, because the sequence (cˆn, lˆn, mˆn)Nn=0








But the sequence uˆ is an admissible strategy so that for any u = (cn, ln,mn)Nn=0
∈ U(x,y)(S, S) from (3.10) we have
w0(x0, y0, S0, S0) = E[V1(x0, y0, S1, S1, cˆ0, lˆ0, lˆ0)|F0] ≥
E[V1(x0, y0, S1, S1, c0, l0,m0)|F0].
Thus, indeed, we have “≥” in (3.11).
In effect, we have the equality in (3.11). This ends the proof. unionsq
To simplify the notation any element of AN−k(x, y, s, s) also will be called an
admissible strategy.
Almost immediately we obtain
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Lemma 3.2 The random functionswN−k(·, ·, s, s)are concave for k=0, 1, 2, . . . , N.
Proof It follows easily by induction from concavity of the utility function g. unionsq
Next result plays an important role in the uniqueness of the optimal strategies.
Theorem 3.1 Under (A1) the random mapping
(x, y) −→ E[wN−k+1(x, y, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k]
is strictly concave for k = 1, 2, . . . , N.
Proof We use induction in k = 1, 2, . . . , N . The case k = 1 follows directly from
strict concavity of g. Assume inductively strict concavity of the random mapping
(x, y) −→ E[wN−k+2(x, y, SN−k+2, SN−k+2)|FN−k+1].
Let F(x, y) := E[wN−k+1(x, y, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k]. By Lemma 3.2 the map-
ping (x, y) → F(x, y) is concave. Assume this function is not strictly concave. Then
there exist pairs of different financial positions (x1, y1), (x2, y2) ∈ R2+ such that for
any t ∈ (0, 1) we have
F(t (x1, y1) + (1 − t)(x2, y2)) = t F(x1, y1) + (1 − t)F(x2, y2). (3.12)
Let (x3, y3) := t (x1, y1)+(1−t)(x2, y2) and (cˆi , lˆi , mˆi ) be optimal one step strategies
in wN−k+1 (the existence of which is guaranteed by Corollary 3.1) for (xi , yi ) with
i = 1, 2. By concavity of g and wN−k+2 taking into account (3.12) we clearly have
that (cˆ3, lˆ3, mˆ3) := t (cˆ1, lˆ1, mˆ1) + (1 − t)(cˆ2, lˆ2, mˆ2) is a.s. optimal for (x3, y3).
Furthermore, by strict concavity of g we have a.s. that cˆ3 = cˆ1 = cˆ2. Therefore by
(3.12) and (3.7) we have
E[(wN−k+2(x3 − cˆ3 + SN−k+1mˆ3 − SN−k+1lˆ3, y3 − mˆ3 + lˆ3,
SN−k+2, SN−k+2)|FN−k] =
tE[(wN−k+2(x1 − cˆ1 + SN−k+1mˆ1SN−k+1lˆ1, y1 − mˆ1 + lˆ1,
SN−k+2, SN−k+2)|FN−k]+
(1 − t)E[(wN−k+2(x2 − cˆ2 + SN−k+1mˆ2 − SN−k+1lˆ2, y2 − mˆ2 + lˆ2,
SN−k+2, SN−k+2)|FN−k]. (3.13)
Since by concavity
E[(wN−k+2(x3 − cˆ3 + SN−k+1mˆ3 − SN−k+1lˆ3, y3 − mˆ3 + lˆ3,
SN−k+2, SN−k+2)|FN−k+1] ≥
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tE[(wN−k+2(x1 − cˆ1 + SN−k+1mˆ1 − SN−k+1lˆ1, y1 − mˆ1 + lˆ1,
SN−k+2, SN−k+2)|FN−k+1]+
(1 − t)E[(wN−k+1(x2 − cˆ2 + SN−k+1mˆ2 − SN−k+1lˆ2, y2 − mˆ2 + lˆ2,
SN−k+2, SN−k+2)|FN−k+1]. (3.14)
we have equality in (3.13) only when we have equality a.s. in (3.14). By induction
hypothesis the random mapping
(x, y) −→ E[wN−k+2(x, y, SN−k+2, SN−k+2)|FN−k+1]
is strictly concave so that from a.s. equality in (3.14) taking into account that cˆ3 =
cˆ2 = cˆ1 we should have a.s.
{
x1 + SN−k+1mˆ1 − SN−k+1lˆ1 = x2 + SN−k+1mˆ2 − SN−k+1lˆ2
y1 − mˆ1 + lˆ1 = y2 − mˆ2 + lˆ2 . (3.15)
Since the strategies are optimal we have that mˆ1lˆ1 = 0 = mˆ2lˆ2. Therefore, the cases
x1 ≥ x2 and y1 > y2 or x2 > x1 and y2 ≥ y1 are not allowed. Assume x1 < x2 and
y1 ≥ y2. Then mˆ2 = 0 = lˆ1 and solving (3.15) we obtain a.s.
y1 − y2









=: a + b (3.16)
Notice that y1−y2x2−x1 is fixed while SN−k+1 is random and by the assumption on the
conditional full support (1.1), since mˆ1 is bounded by y1 so that b ≥ 0 is bounded,
a = 1
SN−k+1
can be arbitrarily big, with a positive probability, which contradicts that
(3.16) should hold a.s. The case x1 ≥ x2 and y1 < y2 can be rejected in a similar way.
Consequently, (3.12) does not hold and we have strict concavity of F . unionsq
Immediately from Theorem 10.2 we obtain
Corollary 3.3 For each (x, y, s, s) ∈ D there exists unique FN−k-measurable ran-
dom variable
(cˆ(x, y, s, s), lˆ(x, y, s, s), mˆ(x, y, s, s))
which takes values in the set A(x, y, s, s) and such that
wN−k(x, y, s, s) = E[g(cˆ(x, y, s, s))+
γwN−k+1(x − cˆ(x, y, s, s) + smˆ(x, y, s, s) − slˆ(x, y, s, s),
y − mˆ(x, y, s, s) + lˆ(x, y, s, s), SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k]. (3.17)
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Moreover, the random mapping
(x, y, s, s) → (cˆN−k(x, y, s, s), lˆN−k(x, y, s, s), mˆN−k(x, y, s, s))
is continuous on the set D.
By simple induction we obtain
Lemma 3.3 For (x, y, s, s) ∈ D we have
wN−k(ρx, ρy, s, s) = (1 + γ + . . . + γ k) ln ρ + wN−k(x, y, s, s), (3.18)
when g(u) = ln u, while
wN−k(ρx, ρy, s, s) = ρα · wN−k(x, y, s, s), (3.19)
when g(u) = uα .
4 Properties of the Optimal Strategies
In this section basing on Bellman equations introduced in Sect. 3 we shall characterize
classes of optimal one step strategies. Let (s, s) ∈ R2+ be such that s > s > 0.
For k = 1, 2, . . . , N let us define the following random sets corresponding respec-
tively to no transaction, selling and buying zones:
NTN−k(s, s) := {(x, y) ∈ R2+ : wN−k(x, y, s, s) = sup
c∈[0,x]
E[g(c)+
γwN−k+1(x − c, y, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k]},
SN−k(s, s) := {(x, y) ∈ R2+ : wN−k(x, y, s, s) = sup
(c,0,m)∈A(x,y,s,s)
E[g(c)+
γwN−k+1(x − c + sm, y − m, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k]}\NTN−k(s, s)
and
BN−k(s, s) := {(x, y) ∈ R2+ : wN−k(x, y, s, s) = sup
(c,l,0)∈A(x,y,s,s)
E[g(c)+
γwN−k+1(x − c − sl, y + l, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k]}\NTN−k(s, s).
If the bid and ask prices of a unit of a stock are s, s respectively, then after optimal
consumption we do not trade, sell or buy stocks if our position is in NTN−k(s, s),
SN−k(s, s) or inBN−k(s, s) respectively. Furthermore, by Lemma 3.3 for g(u) = ln u
or g(u) = uα these sets are cones.
Lemma 4.1 For s, s ∈ R+ such that s > s > 0 any pair of the random triple
NTN−k(s, s), SN−k(s, s), BN−k(s, s) do not have common points.
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Proof Fix s, s ∈ R+ such that s > s > 0. Clearly, by the definition the random sets
SN−k(s, s) and BN−k(s, s) do no have common points with NTN−k(s, s). From the
uniqueness of the optimal strategy (see Corollary 3.3) we obtain that SN−k(s, s) ∩
BN−k(s, s) = ∅. unionsq
Proposition 4.1 For s, s ∈ R+ such that s > s > 0 the random setsNTN−k(s, s)(ω),
SN−k(s, s)(ω), BN−k(s, s)(ω) are connected for each ω ∈ .
Proof Assume thatNTN−k(s, s)(ω) is not connected for someω ∈ . Then in the con-
vex envelope ofNTN−k(s, s)(ω)we should have either elements of SN−k(s, s)(ω), or
of BN−k(s, s)(ω). Assume that we have there elements of SN−k(s, s)(ω). To simplify
notation we shall skip the dependence onω. Since the setNTN−k(s, s) and SN−k(s, s)
is a close wemay assume that there exist (x1, y1), (x1+sm1, y1−m1) ∈ NTN−k(s, s)
for positive m1 such that for some positive m′ < m1 we have that (x2, y2) :=
(x1 + sm′, y1 − m′) and (x2 + sm, y2 − m) ∈ SN−k(s, s) for any m ∈ [0,m1 − m′).
Let c∗ be an optimal consumption for (x2, y2). Clearly, (c∗, 0,m1 −m′) is an optimal
one step strategy for (x2, y2) and
wN−k(x2, y2, s, s)=wN−k(x2 + sm, y2−m, s, s) = wN−k(x1 + sm1, y1 − m, s, s).
Furthermore, wN−k(x1, y1, s, s) ≥ wN−k(x2, y2, s, s) and by concavity of wN−k
(·, ·, s, s) we should have wN−k(x1, y1, s, s) = wN−k(x2, y2, s, s), since otherwise
using concavity we obtain that for m ∈ (0,m1 − m′) we have wN−k(x2 + sm, y2 −
m, s, s) > wN−k(x2, y2, s, s).
If wN−k(x1, y1, s, s) = wN−k(x2, y2, s, s) then the strategy (c∗, 0,m1 − m′) can
not be optimal for (x2, y2) (by uniqueness of optimal strategies, see Corollary 3.3,
selling is not allowed). The case when the convex envelope of NTN−k(s, s) contains
elements ofBN−k(s, s) can be rejected in a similar way. Since the setNTN−k(s, s)(ω)
is close and right boundary of SN−k(s, s) and left boundary of BN−k(s, s) are in
NTN−k(s, s) so that these sets should be connected. unionsq
5 Local Weak Shadow Price
Consider now the case when at a given time moment N − k, where k = 0, 1, . . . , N
instead of bid and ask prices s, s we have a one price sˆ for which we are allowed to
sell and buy assets, while in the next time moments we again have bid and ask prices.
Define the set
Dˆ := {(x, y, sˆ) ∈ R3+ : sˆ > 0}. (5.1)
For (x, y, sˆ) ∈ Dˆ define
vN−k(x, y, sˆ) := sup
(c,l,m)∈B(x,y,sˆ)
E[g(c) + γwN−k+1(x − c + sˆ(m − l), y − m
+ l, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k], (5.2)
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where
B(x, y, sˆ) := {(c, l,m) ∈ [0, x + sˆ y] × R2+ :
∀s∈[0,∞) x − c + (m − l)sˆ + s(y − m + l) ≥ 0}.
or equivalently
B(x, y, sˆ) :={(c, l,m) ∈ [0, x+sˆ y] × R2+ : x − c + sˆ(m − l) ≥ 0, y − m + l ≥ 0}.
In fact, this is the set of constraints we impose on admissible strategies at timemoment
N − k in the case when the asset price is equal to sˆ (we have no frictions) and we do
not want to have negative position in bank or stock account at the next time moment.
Let
B(x, y, sˆ) := {(c, K ) :∈ [0, x + sˆ y] × R : x − c + sˆK ≥ 0, y − K ≥ 0} (5.3)
for (x, y, sˆ) ∈ Dˆ. Clearly,
vN−k(x, y, sˆ) = sup
(c,K )∈B(x,y,sˆ)
E[g(c) + γwN−k+1(x − c + sˆK ,
y − K , SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k]. (5.4)
Moreover we have
Lemma 5.1 Let (x, y, s, s) ∈ D. Then
(c, 0,m) ∈ A(x, y, s, s) ⇔ (c,m) ∈ B(x, y, s) (5.5)
and
(c, l, 0) ∈ A(x, y, s, s) ⇔ (c,−l) ∈ B(x, y, s). (5.6)
By analogy to Theorem 2.1 we obtain
Proposition 5.1 For (x, y, sˆ) ∈ Dˆ the set B(x, y, sˆ) is convex and compact. Further-
more the mapping
Dˆ  (x, y, sˆ) −→ B(x, y, sˆ)
is continuous in Hausdorff metric.
From the Theorem 3.1 using also Theorems 10.1 and 10.2 we obtain
Proposition 5.2 The random mapping
B(x, y, sˆ)  (c, K ) −→ E[g(c)+
γwN−k+1(x − c + sˆK , y − K , SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k] (5.7)
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is a strictly concave for (x, y, sˆ) ∈ Dˆ. Moreover for each (x, y, sˆ) ∈ Dˆ there exists
a unique FN−k-measurable random variable (cˆ(x, y, sˆ), Kˆ (x, y, sˆ)) taking values in
the set B(x, y, sˆ) which is an optimal one step strategy, i.e.
vN−k(x, y, sˆ) = E[g(cˆ(x, y, sˆ))+
γwN−k+1(x − cˆ(x, y, sˆ) + sˆ Kˆ (x, y, sˆ),
y − Kˆ (x, y, sˆ), SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k]. (5.8)
Furthermore, the random mapping (x, y, sˆ) −→ (cˆ(x, y, sˆ), Kˆ (x, y, sˆ)) is continu-
ous.
We now introduce the notion of weak shadow price, which we consider first locally.
Definition 5.1 A family {SˆN−k(x, y, s, s) : (x, y, s, s) ∈ D} of random variables is
called local weak shadow price at time N − k, if
(i) for every (x, y, s, s) ∈ D the random variable SˆN−k(x, y, s, s) is FN−k -
measurable,
(ii) ∀(x,y,s,s)∈D s ≤ SˆN−k(x, y, s, s) ≤ s,
(iii) ∀(x,y,s,s)∈D vN−k(x, y, SˆN−k(x, y, s, s)) = wN−k(x, y, s, s).
The notion of the localweak shadowprice is crucial for the construction of globalweak
shadow price.We look at ourmarket at timemoment N−k for a price SˆN−k(x, y, s, s),
which is between bid and ask prices, and for which value of our functional correspond-
ing to the case when at time N − k we have just one price SˆN−k(x, y, s, s) and in
the next time moments we have again bid and ask prices, is the same as in the case
in which all time we have bid and ask prices. The local weak shadow price depends
on the value of the bid and ask prices s, s at time moment N − k and on the ini tial
portfolio position at the beginning of this time moment.
For sˆ > 0 and for k = 1, . . . , N let
NˆTN−k(sˆ) := {(x, y) ∈ R2+ : vN−k(x, y, sˆ) =
= sup
c∈[0,x]
E[g(c) + γwN−k+1(x − c, y, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k]},
SˆN−k(sˆ) := {(x, y) ∈ R2+ : vN−k(x, y, sˆ) = sup
(c,0,m)∈B(x,y,sˆ)
E[g(c)+
γwN−k+1(x − c + sˆm, y − m, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k]} \ NˆTN−k(sˆ)
and
BˆN−k(sˆ) := {(x, y) ∈ R2+ : vN−k(x, y, sˆ) = sup
(c,l,0)∈B(x,y,sˆ)
E[g(c)+
γwN−k+1(x − c − sˆl, y + l, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k]} \ NˆTN−k(sˆ).
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The sets NˆTN−k(sˆ), SˆN−k(sˆ) and SˆN−k(sˆ) correspond to no transaction, selling and
buying zones in the case of one selling and buying price equal to sˆ. For g(u) = ln u
or g(u) = uα these sets are clearly cones.
Proposition 5.3 For eachω ∈  there exists a continuous function f ω : R2+ −→ R2+
such that
NˆTN−k(sˆ)(ω) = {( f ω(t, sˆ)) ∈ R2+ : t ∈ R+}. (5.9)
Furthermore if the mapping (x, y) → vN−k(x, y, sˆ) is differentiable for any sˆ > 0
then for sˆ = sˆ′ we have
NˆTN−k(sˆ)(ω) ∩ NˆTN−k(sˆ′)(ω) ⊂ [0,∞) × {0} . (5.10)
Proof From Proposition 5.2 and Theorem 3.1 we get that there exists a unique FN−k-
measurable continuous random function (cˆ, Kˆ ) : Dˆ −→ R2 such that for each
(x, y, sˆ) ∈ Dˆ the random variable (cˆ(x, y, sˆ), Kˆ (x, y, sˆ)) takes values in the set
B(x, y, sˆ) and for each (x, y, sˆ) ∈ Dˆ we have that
vN−k(x, y, sˆ) = E[g(cˆ(x, y, sˆ)) + γwN−k+1(x − cˆ(x, y, sˆ) + sˆ Kˆ (x, y, sˆ),
y − Kˆ (x, y, sˆ), SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k].
Since on the line x + ysˆ = t there is a unique point belonging to the no transaction
zone we have that
f ω(t, sˆ) = (t + sˆ Kˆ (t, 0, sˆ),−Kˆ (t, 0, sˆ)) (5.11)
from which (5.9) and continuity of f ω follows.
Assume now that (x¯, y¯) ∈ NˆTN−k(sˆ)(ω) ∩ NˆTN−k(sˆ′)(ω) for sˆ < sˆ′ and y¯ > 0.
Since for s = sˆ or s = sˆ′
vN−k(x¯, y¯, s) = sup
c∈[0,x¯]
E[g(c) + γwN−k+1(x¯ − c, y¯, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k]
(5.12)
we have that vN−k(x¯, y¯, sˆ) = vN−k(x¯, y¯, sˆ′) = vˆN−k(x¯, y¯). Moreover for (x, y) ∈
R
2+ such that x + ysˆ = x¯ + y¯sˆ or x + ysˆ′ = x¯ + y¯sˆ′ we have vN−k(x, y, sˆ) =
vN−k(x, y, sˆ′) = vN−k(x¯, y¯, sˆ). Furthermore one can easily show that for any s˜ ∈
[sˆ, sˆ′] whenever x + ys˜ = x¯ + y¯s˜ we have also vN−k(x, y, s˜) = vN−k(x¯, y¯, s˜) =
vN−k(x¯, y¯, sˆ). Therefore directional derivative of vN−k(x¯, y¯, sˆ) along the line x+ys˜ =
x¯ + y¯s˜ should be equal to 0, as a derivative of a constant function, in particular at
(x¯, y¯) we have
v′N−k,x (x¯, y¯, sˆ)(−s˜) + v′N−k,y(x¯, y¯, sˆ) = 0 (5.13)
for any s˜ ∈ (sˆ, sˆ′), which means that v′N−k,x (x¯, y¯, sˆ) = 0 = v′N−k,y(x¯, y¯, sˆ), which
contradicts the fact that vN−k(x, y, sˆ) is strictly increasing in x and y. Consequently
we obtain (5.10). unionsq
Taking into account NˆTN−k(sˆ) is an image of a continuous function f ω which has
exactly one intersection point with each line x + sˆ y = t , for t ≥ 0 we easily obtain
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Corollary 5.1 The sets BˆN−k(sˆ) and SˆN−k(sˆ) are connected for sˆ > 0.
Remark 5.1 In the case, when g(u) = ln u or g(u) = uα , the sets NˆTN−k(sˆ),
BˆN−k(sˆ) and SˆN−k(sˆ) are cones, and therefore from Proposition 5.3 we get that the
set NˆTN−k(sˆ) is a half line starting from the point (0, 0).
6 Optimal Consumption in the Markets Locally Without Friction
with Logarithmic and Power Utility Functions
In this section we show formulas for optimal consumption in the market in which at
a given time moment we have one selling and buying price (we don’t have frictions).
Notice first that in the equation (5.4) we can replace control variable K by b ∈ [0, 1]
representing a portion of ourwealth invested in the stockmarket. Then for (x, y, sˆ) ∈ Dˆ
we have
vN−k(x, y, sˆ) := sup
(c,K )∈B(x,y,sˆ)
E[g(c) + γwN−k+1(x − c + sˆK ,
y − m + l, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k] = sup
(c,b)∈[0,x+sˆ y]×[0,1]
E[g(c)+
γwN−k+1((1 − b)(x + sˆ y − c), b(x + sˆ y − c)
sˆ
, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k] (6.1)
In the case when g(u) = ln u using Lemma 3.3 we obtain
vN−k(x, y, sˆ) = sup
c∈[0,x+sˆ y]
[ln c + γ (1 + γ + . . . + γ k) ln(x − c + sˆ y)]+
sup
b∈[0,1]
E[wN−k+1(1 − b, b
sˆ
, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k]. (6.2)
and then by Lemma 10.2 the supremum is attained for c = cˆN−k(x, y, sˆ), where
cˆN−k(x, y, sˆ) = x + sˆ y
1 + γ + · · · + γ k . (6.3)
In the case when g(u) = uα by Lemma 3.3 we have
vN−k(x, y, sˆ) = sup
c∈[0,x+sˆ y]
[cα + γ (x − c + sˆ y)α·
sup
b∈[0,1]
E[wN−k+1(1 − b, b
sˆ
, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k] =
sup
c∈[0,x+sˆ y]
[cα + D˜N−k(sˆ) · (x − c + sˆ y)α], (6.4)
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[cα + D˜N−k(sˆ) · (x − c + sˆ y)α] (6.5)
by Lemma 10.3 is attained for c = cˆN−k(x, y, sˆ), where
cˆN−k(x, y, sˆ) = x + sˆ y
1 + [D˜N−k(sˆ)] 11−α
. (6.6)
Substituting (6.3) into (6.2) and (6.6) into (6.4) we immediately obtain
Corollary 6.1 If g(u) = ln u or g(u) = uα the function (x, y) → vN−k(x, y, sˆ) is
differentiable and consequently we have (5.10).
7 Properties of Selling and Buying Zones
The construction of shadow price is based on relations between the random sets SˆN−k ,
BˆN−k and SN−k ,BN−k respectively which we shall show in this section. We start with
a useful simple
Lemma 7.1 For (x, y, s, s) ∈ D and sˆ ∈ [s, s] we have:
A(x, y, s, s) ⊆ B(x, y, sˆ), (7.1)
and consequently
vN−k(x, y, sˆ) ≥ wN−k(x, y, s, s). (7.2)
First we consider relation between SˆN−k and SN−k .
Proposition 7.1 For s, s ∈ R+ such that s > s > 0 and all ω ∈  we have
SˆN−k(s)(ω) = SN−k(s, s)(ω). (7.3)
Proof Assume that (x, y) ∈ SˆN−k(s)(ω) for certain ω ∈ . Then there is an FN−k-
measurable triple (c˜(ω), 0, m˜(ω)) taking values in B(x, y, s)(ω) such that m˜(ω) > 0
and
vN−k(x, y, s) = E[g(c˜) + γwN−k(x − c˜ + sm˜, y − m˜, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k],
(7.4)
where to simplify notation we drop the dependence on ω. Since also (c˜, 0, m˜) ∈
A(x, y, s, s) then taking into account (7.2) we have
wN−k(x, y, s) = E[g(c˜) + γwN−k(x − c˜ + sm˜, y − m˜, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k],
(7.5)
which means that (x, y) ∈ SN−k(s, s)(ω).
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Assume now that (x, y) ∈ SN−k(s, s)(ω). Then there exists an FN−k-measurable
random triple (cˆ, 0, mˆ) which takes values in A(x, y, s, s) such that
wN−k(x, y, s, s)=E[g(cˆ)+γwN−k+1(x−cˆ+smˆ, y−mˆ, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k].
(7.6)
If (x, y) ∈ NˆTN−k(s)(ω) then there is (c˜, 0, 0) ∈ B(x, y, s) such that
vN−k(x, y, s) = E[g(c˜) + γwN−k+1(x − c˜, y, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k] (7.7)
and since also (c˜, 0, 0) ∈ A(x, y, s, s) then taking into account (7.2) we obtain that
wN−k(x, y, s, s)=E[g(c˜) + γwN−k+1(x − c˜, y, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k], (7.8)
which means that (x, y) ∈ NTN−k(s, s)(ω), what is a contradiction. If (x, y) ∈
BˆN−k(s)(ω) then there is (c˜, l˜, 0) ∈ B(x, y, s) such that l˜ > 0 and
vN−k(x, y, s) = E[g(c˜) + γwN−k+1(x − c˜ − sl˜, y + l˜, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k].
(7.9)
Consider now the triple λ(cˆ, 0, mˆ) + (1 − λ)(c˜, l˜, 0) with λ = l˜
mˆ+l˜ ∈ [0, 1]. Note
that λ(cˆ, 0, mˆ)+ (1−λ)(c˜, l˜, 0) ∈ A(x, y, s, s). By concavity of the random function
F : B(x, y, s) −→ R defined in the following way
F(c, l,m) :=
E[g(c) + γwN−k+1(x − c + s(m − l), y − m + l, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k]
(7.10)
we have using again (7.2) that
F(λcˆ + (1 − λ)c˜, (1 − λ)l˜, λmˆ) ≥ E[g(λcˆ + (1 − λ)c˜)+
γwN−k+1(x − λcˆ + (1 − λ)c˜, y, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k] ≥
λwN−k(x, y, s, s) + (1 − λ)vN−k(x, y, s) ≥ wN−k(x, y, s, s). (7.11)
From (7.11) we have that
wN−k(x, y, s, s) = E[g(λcˆ + (1 − λ)c˜)+
γwN−k+1(x − λcˆ + (1 − λ)c˜, y, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k],
which means that (x, y) ∈ NTN−k(s, s)(ω), which is a contradiction. unionsq
Next relation between the sets BˆN−k(s) and BN−k(s, s) shall require two technical
lemmas.
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Lemma 7.2 Let (x, y, s, s) ∈ D and (cˆ, lˆ, 0) ∈ A(x, y, s, s), (c˜, 0, m˜) ∈ B(x, y, s)
be such that lˆ, m˜ > 0. Then for λ ∈ (0, 1) such that λ > m˜
lˆ+m˜ we have
(λcˆ + (1 − λ)c˜, λlˆ − (1 − λ)m˜, 0) ∈ A(x, y, s, s). (7.12)
Proof For any λ ∈ [0, 1] we have 0 ≤ λcˆ + (1 − λ)c˜ ≤ x + sy and
x − [λcˆ+ (1− λ)c˜] − s[λlˆ − (1− λ)m˜] = λ(x − cˆ− slˆ)+ (1− λ)(x − c˜+ sm˜) ≥ 0.
Whenever 1 > λ > m˜
lˆ+m˜ we have λlˆ − (1 − λ)m˜ > 0 and (7.12) holds. unionsq
Lemma 7.3 Let s, s ∈ R+ be such that s > s > 0. Then for ω ∈  we have
SˆN−k(s)(ω) ∩ BN−k(s, s)(ω) = ∅. (7.13)
Proof Assume this is not true. Then there exists somepair (x, y) of two strictly positive
numbers such that the event
A := {(x, y) ∈ SˆN−k(s) ∩ BN−k(s, s)} = ∅. (7.14)
Let (c˜, l˜, m˜) be an optimal one step strategy in the market locally without frictions
with the price s, i.e. let (c˜, l˜, m˜) be an FN−k-measurable random variable which takes
values in the set B(x, y, s) such that
vN−k(x, y, s) =
E[g(c˜) + γwN−k+1(x − c˜ + s(m˜ − l˜), y − m˜ + l˜, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k].
Let (cˆ, lˆ, mˆ) be an optimal one step strategy in the primary market i.e. (cˆ, lˆ, mˆ) is
FN−k-measurable random variable taking values in the set A(x, y, s, s) such that
wN−k(x, y, s, s) =
E[g(cˆ) + γwN−k+1(x − cˆ + smˆ − slˆ, y − mˆ + lˆ, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k].
On the event A we clearly have (c˜, l˜, m˜) = (c˜, 0, m˜), (cˆ, lˆ, mˆ) = (cˆ, lˆ, 0) and
lˆ, m˜ > 0.
Let λ be an FN−k-measurable random variable taking values in the interval [0, 1]
such that on A we have λlˆ − (1 − λ)mˆ > 0. From the property (7.12) we have that
(λcˆ+(1−λ)c˜, λlˆ−(1−λ)m˜, 0) is a well definedFN−k-measurable random variable,
which on A takes values in the set A(x, y, s, s).
Since on A we have
(λcˆ + (1 − λ)c˜, λlˆ − (1 − λ)m˜, 0) = (cˆ, lˆ, 0), (7.15)
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from the strict concavity of the function g and of the random function
(x, y) −→ E[wN−k+1(x, y, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k],
taking into account the property (7.2) we get that on A we have
wN−k(x, y, s, s) ≥
g(λcˆ + (1 − λ)c˜) + γwN−k+1(x − (λcˆ + (1 − λ)c˜) − s(λlˆ − (1 − λ)m˜),
y − (1 − λ)m˜ + λlˆ SN−k+1, SN−k+1|FN−k) >
λE[g(cˆ) + γwN−k+1(x − cˆ − slˆ, y − mˆ + lˆ, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k]+
(1 − λ)E[g(c˜) + γwN−k+1(x − c˜ + s(m˜ − l˜),
y − m˜ + l˜, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k] ≥
λwN−k(x, y, s, s) + (1 − λ)vN−k(x, y, s) ≥
λwN−k(x, y, s, s) + (1 − λ)wN−k(x, y, s, s) = wN−k(x, y, s, s)
which is a contradiction and therefore we have (7.13). unionsq
We are now in position to compare the sets BˆN−k(s)(ω) and BN−k(s, s)(ω).
Proposition 7.2 Let s, s ∈ R+ be such that s > s > 0. Then for ω ∈ 
BˆN−k(s)(ω) = BN−k(s, s)(ω). (7.16)
Proof Notice first that by Lemma 7.3 we have that SˆN−k(s)(ω)∩BN−k(s, s)(ω) = ∅
for ω ∈ . Let for (x, y) ∈ R2+
(c˜, l˜, m˜) := (c˜(x, y, s), l˜(x, y, s), m˜(x, y, s))
be an optimal FN−k-measurable one step strategy in the market locally without fric-
tions with the price s, i.e.
vN−k(x, y, s) = E[g(c˜) + γwN−k+1(x − c˜ + s(m˜ − l˜), y − m˜
+ l˜, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k].
Let (x, y) ∈ BˆN−k(s)(ω). Without loss of generality we can assume that l˜(ω) >
m˜(ω) = 0 and (c˜(ω), l˜(ω), 0) ∈ B(x, y, s) and by (5.6) we also have (c˜(ω), l˜(ω), 0) ∈
A(x, y, s, s). Therefore,
wN−k(x, y, s, s)(ω) ≥
E[g(c˜)+γwN−k+1(x−c˜+s(m˜−l˜), y − m˜ + l˜, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k](ω)
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which means that (x, y) ∈ BN−k(s, s)(ω). Let now (x, y) ∈ BN−k(s, s)(ω) and
assume that (x, y) /∈ BˆN−k(s)(ω). By (7.13) we have also that (x, y) /∈ SˆN−k(s)(ω).
Therefore, (x, y) ∈ NˆTN−k(s)(ω) and for (c˜, 0, 0) ∈ B(x, y, s) we have
vN−k(x, y, s)(ω) = E[g(c˜)+
γwN−k+1(x − c˜, y, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k](ω) ≥ wN−k(x, y, s, s)(ω).
Since also (c˜, 0, 0) ∈ A(x, y, s, s) we have that
wN−k(x, y, s, s)(ω) = E[g(c˜)+
γwN−k+1(x − c˜, y, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k](ω)
which means that (x, y) ∈ NTN−k(s, s)(ω), which is a contradiction. unionsq
Remark 7.1 FromCorollary 5.1 taking into account Propositions 7.1 and 7.2we obtain
an alternative proof of the fact that the sets BN−k(s, s)(ω) and SN−k(s, s)(ω) are
connected for ω ∈ .
8 Construction of Local Weak Shadow Price
In this section we construct shadow price. For this purpose we shall need a number of
properties of selling and buying cones corresponding to different asset prices on the
market locally without friction. We start with an obvious
Lemma 8.1 Let (x, y) ∈ R2+ and let 0 < s1 ≤ s2. Then the following implications
hold
(c, 0,m) ∈ B(x, y, s1) ⇒ (c, 0,m) ∈ B(x, y, s2) (8.1)
and
(c, l, 0) ∈ B(x, y, s2) ⇒ (c, l, 0) ∈ B(x, y, s1). (8.2)
Next Lemma shows relations between selling and buying cones for different asset
prices.
Lemma 8.2 Let s1, s2 ∈ R+ be such that 0 < s1 ≤ s2. Then
SˆN−k(s1) ⊆ SˆN−k(s2) (8.3)
and
BˆN−k(s2) ⊆ BˆN−k(s1). (8.4)
Proof We will prove only (8.4). The proof of (8.3) is similar. Fix ω ∈ . Let (x, y) ∈
BˆN−k(s2)(ω). Then there is an optimal one step strategy (c˜, l˜, m˜) such that
vN−k(x, y, s2) = E[g(c˜) + γwN−k+1(x − c˜ + s2(m˜ − l˜), y − m˜
+ l˜, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k].
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Let (c∗, 0,m∗) be an FN−k measurable triple taking values in the set B(x, y, s1).
Taking into account that by (8.1) the random variable (c∗, 0,m∗) takes values in
B(x, y, s2), we have
vN−k(x, y, s1)(ω) ≥
E[g(c˜) + γwN−k+1(x − c˜ − s1l˜, y + l˜, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k](ω) >
E[g(c˜) + γwN−k+1(x − c˜ − s2l˜, y + l˜, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k](ω) =
vN−k(x, y, s2)(ω) ≥
E[g(c∗) + γwN−k+1(x − c∗ + s2m∗, y − m∗, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k](ω) ≥
E[g(c∗) + γwN−k+1(x − c∗ + s1m∗, y − m∗, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k](ω).
Consequently, taking into account that the strategy (c∗, 0,m∗) could be arbitrary
we have (x, y) /∈ SˆN−k(s1)(ω) ∪ NˆTN−k(s1)(ω), which means that (x, y) ∈
BˆN−k(s1)(ω), which completes the proof. unionsq
The following two properties of no transaction zone will be important later

















(SˆN−k(sˆ) ∪ BˆN−k(sˆ)) == R2+ \ (SˆN−k(s) ∪ BˆN−k(s)) =
R
2+ \ (SN−k(s, s) ∪ BN−k(s, s)) = NTN−k(s, s).
unionsq
Lemma 8.4 If s1, s2, sˆ ∈ R+ are such that 0 < s1 ≤ sˆ ≤ s2 then
NˆTN−k(s1) ∩ NˆTN−k(s2) ⊆ NˆTN−k(sˆ). (8.6)
Proof From (8.3) and (8.4) we have
NˆTN−k(s1) ∩ NˆTN−k(s2) =
[R2+ \ (SˆN−k(s1) ∪ BˆN−k(s1))] ∩ [R2+ \ (SˆN−k(s2) ∪ BˆN−k(s2))] =
R
2+ \ [(SˆN−k(s1) ∪ BˆN−k(s1)) ∪ (SˆN−k(s2) ∪ BˆN−k(s2))] =
R
2+ \ (BˆN−k(s1) ∪ SˆN−k(s2)) ⊆ R2+ \ (BˆN−k(sˆ) ∪ SˆN−k(sˆ)) = NˆTN−k(sˆ).
unionsq
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Appl Math Optim (2015) 72:391–433 413
In what follows we shall try to characterize FN−k-measurable random variables
s∗N−k(x, y, s, s), taking values in [s, s], such that (x, y) ∈ NˆTN−k(s∗N−k(x, y, s, s)).
Proposition 8.1 Let for (x, y, s, s) ∈ D




s for {(x, y) ∈ SN−k(s, s)}
inf{s ∈ [s, s] : (x, y) ∈ NˆTN−k(s)} for {(x, y) ∈ NTN−k(s, s)}
s for {(x, y) ∈ BN−k(s, s)}
(8.7)
and




s for {(x, y) ∈ SN−k(s, s)}
sup{s ∈ [s, s] : (x, y) ∈ NˆTN−k(s)} for {(x, y) ∈ NTN−k(s, s)}
s for {(x, y) ∈ BN−k(s, s)}
.
(8.8)
Then s∗N−k and s∗N−k are well defined FN−k-measurable random functions from D
to (0,∞). Moreover s∗N−k and s∗N−k are lower and upper semicontinuous on the
event {(x, y) ∈ NTN−k(s, s)}. Furthermore, for each (x, y, s, s) ∈ D on the event
{(x, y) ∈ NTN−k(s, s)} we have
(x, y) ∈ NˆTN−k(s∗N−k(x, y, s, s)) ∩ NˆTN−k(s∗N−k(x, y, s, s)). (8.9)
Proof Fix (x, y, s, s) ∈ D. We are going to show first that s∗N−k(x, y, s, s) and
s∗N−k(x, y, s, s) are well defined FN−k-measurable random variables.
Notice first that from (8.5) for eachω ∈  and each (x, y) ∈ NTN−k(s, s)(ω) there
is sN−k(x, y, ω) ∈ [s, s] such that (x, y) ∈ NˆTN−k(sN−k(x, y, ω))(ω).
Furthermore
{s∗N−k(x, y, s, s) = s} = {(x, y) ∈ SN−k(s, s)} ∪ {(x, y) ∈ NˆTN−k(s)} ∈ FN−k
and
{s∗N−k(x, y, s, s) = s} = {(x, y) ∈ BN−k(s, s)} ∪ {(x, y) ∈ NˆTN−k(s)} ∈ FN−k .
Moreover using (8.3) and (8.4) we obtain
{s∗N−k(x, y, s, s) = s} =
= {(x, y) ∈ BN−k(s, s)} ∪
⋃
s∈[s,s)
{(x, y) ∈ SˆN−k(s)} =
= {(x, y) ∈ BN−k(s, s)} ∪
⋃
s∈[s,s)∩Q
{(x, y) ∈ SˆN−k(s)} ∈ FN−k
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and
{s∗N−k(x, y, s, s) = s} =
= {(x, y) ∈ SN−k(s, s)} ∪
⋃
s∈(s,s]
{(x, y) ∈ BˆN−k(s)} =
= {(x, y) ∈ SN−k(s, s)} ∪
⋃
s∈(s,s]∩Q
{(x, y) ∈ BˆN−k(s)} ∈ FN−k .
For any t ∈ (s, s) we have
{s > s∗N−k(x, y, s, s) > t} =
⋃
s∈(t,s)∩Q




{(x, y) ∈ BˆN−k(s)} ∈ FN−k
and
{t > s∗N−k(x, y, s, s) > s} =
⋃
s∈(s,t)∩Q




{(x, y) ∈ SˆN−k(s)} ∈ FN−k,
whichmeans that s∗N−k(x, y, s, s) are s∗N−k(x, y, s, s)well definedFN−k-measurable
random variables.
We now show that on the event {(x, y) ∈ NTN−k(s, s)} we have (8.9). Fix ω ∈
{(x, y) ∈ NTN−k(s, s)} and let (snω)∞n=1 and (snω)∞n=1 be any two sequences from the
interval [s, s] convergent respectively to s∗N−k(x, y, s, s) and s∗N−k(x, y, s, s) such
that for any n ∈ N we have (x, y) ∈ NˆTN−k(snω)(ω) ∩ NˆTN−k(snω)(ω). Then for
n ∈ N we have
vN−k(x, y, snω)(ω) = vN−k(x, y, snω)(ω) =
= sup
c∈[0,x]
E[g(c) + γwN−k+1(x − c, y, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k](ω).
By continuity of vN−k(x, y, ·) letting n −→ ∞ we obtain
vN−k(x, y, s∗N−k(x, y, s, s)(ω))(ω) = vˆN−k(x, y, s∗N−k(x, y, s, s)(ω))(ω) =
= sup
c∈[0,x]
E[g(c) + γwN−k+1(x − c, y, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k](ω).
Therefore we have (8.9) on the event {(x, y) ∈ NTN−k(s, s)}.
It remains to show that s∗N−k(x, y, s, s) and s∗N−k(x, y, s, s) are also measurable
functions (of their coordinates). For this purpose it suffices to prove their lower
and upper semicontinuity, respectively, on the set {(x, y) ∈ NTN−k(s, s)}. Fix
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ω ∈ {(x, y) ∈ NTN−k(s, s)}. Let (xn, yn, sn, sn)∞n=1 be a sequence fromD convergent








s∗N−k(xn, yn, sn, sn)(ω) ≤ s∗N−k(x, y, s, s)(ω)
We shall show only the first inequality since the other can be shown in a similar way.
There are three cases:
1o for infinitelymany n ∈ Nwe have (xn, yn) ∈ SN−k(sn, sn)(ω). Choosing a suitable
subsequence we can assume that (xn, yn) ∈ SN−k(sn, sn)(ω) for n ∈ N and then
s∗N−k(xn, yn, sn, sn)(ω) = sn n→∞−−−→ s. By (8.9) for n ∈ N we have
vN−k(xn, yn, s∗N−k(xn, yn, sn, sn)(ω))(ω) = sup
(c,l,m)∈B(xn ,yn ,s∗N−k (xn ,yn ,sn ,sn)(ω))
E[g(c) +
γwN−k+1(xn − c + s∗N−k(xn, yn, sn, sn)(ω) · (m − l), yn − m + l, SN−k+1,
SN−k+1)|FN−k](ω) = sup
(c,l,m)∈B(xn ,yn ,s∗N−k (xn ,yn ,sn ,sn)(ω))
E[g(c) +
γwN−k+1(xn − c, yn, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k](ω).
By continuity of vN−k using Theorem 10.1 and letting n −→ ∞ we obtain
vN−k(x, y, s)(ω) =
sup
(c,l,m)∈B(x,y,s)
E[g(c) + γwN−k+1(x − c, y, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k](ω),
which means that (x, y) ∈ NˆTN−k(s)(ω) and s∗N−k(x, y, s, s)(ω) = s.
2o for infinitely many n ∈ N we have (xn, yn) ∈ BN−k(sn, sn)(ω). As above we
may assume (choosing a suitable subsequence) that (xn, yn) ∈ BN−k(sn, sn)(ω)
for n ∈ N. Then s∗N−k(xn, yn, sn, sn)(ω) = sn n→∞−−−→ s ≥ s∗N−k(x, y, s, s)(ω).
3o for infinitely may n ∈ N we have (xn, yn) ∈ NTN−k(sn, sn)(ω). We may assume
that (xn, yn) ∈ NTN−k(sn, sn)(ω) for n ∈ N and by (8.9) for n ∈ N we have
(xn, yn) ∈ NˆTN−k(s∗N−k(xn, yn, sn, sn)(ω))(ω). Let (nl)∞l=1 be such subsequence
that s∗N−k(xnl , ynl , snl , snl )(ω)
l→∞−−−→ lim infn−→∞ s∗N−k(xn, yn, sn, sn)(ω). By
continuity of vN−k and Theorem 10.1 we obtain
vN−k(xnl , ynl , s∗N−k(xnl , ynl , snl , snl )(ω))(ω)
l→∞−−−→ vN−k(x, y, lim inf
n−→∞ s
∗
N−k(xn, yn, sn, sn)(ω))(ω)
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and
vN−k(xnl , ynl , s∗N−k(xnl , ynl , snl , snl )(ω))(ω) =
sup
(c,0,0)∈B(xnl ,ynl ,s∗N−k (xnl ,ynl ,snl ,snl )(ω))
E[g(c) +
γwN−k+1(xnl − c, ynl , SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k](ω) l→∞−−−→
sup
(c,0,0)∈B(x,y,lim infn−→∞ s∗N−k (xn ,yn ,sn ,sn)(ω))
E[g(c) +
γwN−k+1(x − c, y, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k](ω).
Therefore (x, y) ∈ NˆTN−k(lim infn−→∞ s∗N−k(xn, yn, sn, sn)(ω))(ω), which
completes the proof of lower semicontinuity of s∗N−k .
unionsq
Corollary 8.1 Let sˆN−k : D −→ (0,∞) be defined by the formula
sˆN−k(x, y, s, s) := 1
2
s∗N−k(x, y, s, s) +
1
2
s∗N−k(x, y, s, s) (8.10)
for (x, y, s, s) ∈ D. Then on the event {(x, y) ∈ NTN−k(s, s)} we have
(x, y) ∈ NˆTN−k(sˆN−k(x, y, s, s)). (8.11)
Proof It follows directly from (8.6) and (8.9). unionsq
Remark 8.1 Note that due to the Proposition 5.3 under differentiability of vN−k we
have that the random function sˆN−k defined by (8.10) is the unique random func-
tion for which (8.11) holds since then s∗N−k(x, y, s, s) = s∗N−k(x, y, s, s) . When
s∗N−k(x, y, s, s) < s
∗
N−k(x, y, s, s) the random function sˆN−k for which (8.11) holds
is not defined in a unique way.
Having defined sˆN−k(x, y) we are allowed to formulate the main result of this
section
Theorem 8.1 For (x, y, s, s) ∈ D let SˆN (x, y, s, s) = s and for k = 1, . . . , N
SˆN−k(x, y, s, s) := sˆN−k(x, y, s, s) (8.12)
where the random mapping sˆ is defined by (8.10). Then the family {SˆN−k(x, y, s, s) :
(x, y, s, s) ∈ D} is a local weak shadow price at time moment N − k, for k =
1, 2, . . . , N, i.e. it is FN−k-measurable and
vN−k(x, y, SˆN−k(x, y, s, s)) = sup
(c,l,m)∈B(x,y,SˆN−k (x,y,s,s))
E[g(c)
+ γwN−k+1(x−c+ SˆN−k(x, y, s, s) · (m − l), y−m
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+l, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k]
= wN−k(x, y, s, s), (8.13)
and the optimal strategies at time moment N − k in market with price SˆN−k and in
the market with bid and ask prices s¯, s respectively, are the same.
Proof It is a consequence of previous facts, namely Propositions 7.1, 7.2 and (8.11).
We have to show equality (8.13). By Propositions 7.1 and 7.2 we have equality (8.13)
for (x, y) in SN−k(s, s) or in BN−k(s, s) respectively. For (x, y) ∈ NTN−k(s, s) we
have (x, y) ∈ NˆTN−k(sˆN−k(x, y, s, s)), which again implies equality (8.13). Equality
of optimal strategies at time moment N − k in the markets with price SˆN−k and bid
and ask prices s, s follows directly from the equation (8.13). unionsq
9 Weak Shadow Price and Shadow Price (Strong Shadow Price)
In the previous four sections we considered a market which was locally at a given time
moment without friction but with the asset price depending on our financial position,
while in the other moments of time we had transaction cots (bid and ask prices). Now,
we shall introduce shadow price over the whole time horizon. The main result of
the paper states that expected values of discounted utilities and the optimal strategies
are the same for the original market with bid and ask prices and for the market with
suitably defined shadow price. We start with the following
Definition 9.1 Afamily Sˆ := {Sˆn(x, y, s, s) : n ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , N }, (x, y, s, s) ∈ D}
will be called weak shadow price, if
(i) for each n ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , N } and for each (x, y, s, s) ∈ D the random variable
Sˆn(x, y, s, s) is Fn-measurable,
(ii) ∀n∈{0,1,2,...,N }∀(x,y,s,s)∈D s ≤ Sˆn(x, y, s, s) ≤ s,
(iii) the optimal value of the functional (1.2) of an investor in the frictionless market
starting at time n ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , N } from a position (x, y) and trading stocks
with the price Sˆn(x, y, Sn, Sn), is the same as in the market with transaction
costs.
In the case when market is governed by the family Sˆ of asset prices satisfying condi-
tions (i)–ii) of Definition 9.1 we will say that we have a market with price system Sˆ.
Proposition 9.1 Let uˆ ∈ U(x,y)(S, S) be the optimal strategy in the market with trans-
action costs with initial position (x, y). Assume there exists a weak shadow price Sˆ.
Then the strategy uˆ is also optimal in the frictionless market with price system Sˆ.
Proof Denote by U(x,y)(Sˆ) the set of all admissible strategies in the frictionless mar-
ket with price system Sˆ and with initial position (x, y). From the condition (i i i) of





J(u) = J(uˆ). (9.1)
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Therefore it remains to show that uˆ is admissible in the frictionless market with the
price system Sˆ. Since for each n ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , N } we have
Sn ≤ Sˆn(xˆn, yˆn, S, S) ≤ Sn .
Taking into account that uˆ ∈ U(x,y)(S, S) we have that
0 ≤ cˆn ≤ xˆn + Sn yˆn ≤ xˆn + Sˆn(xˆn, yˆn, Sn, Sn)yˆn,
0 ≤ xˆn − cˆn + Snmˆn − Snlˆn ≤
≤ xˆn − cˆn + Sˆn(xˆn, yˆn, Sn, Sn)mˆn − Sˆn(xˆn, yˆn, Sn, Sn)lˆn ≤
≤ xˆn − cˆn + Sˆn(xˆn, yˆn, Sn, Sn) · (mˆn − lˆn),
0 ≤ yˆn − mˆn + lˆn,
which means that, indeed, uˆ ∈ U(x,y)(Sˆ). This ends the proof. unionsq
In the following definition we stress very firmly the dependence on the initial
position in the market with transaction costs.
Definition 9.2 For agiven initial position (x, y) ∈ R2+\{(0, 0)} aprocess S˜ = (S˜n)Nn=0
depending on this initial position will be called shadow price (strong shadow price),
if
(i) it is adapted,
(ii) ∀n∈{0,1,2,...,N } Sn ≤ S˜n ≤ Sn ,
(iii) the optimal value of the functional (1.2) in a frictionless market with price process
S˜ is the same as in themarket with transaction costs with the initial position (x, y).
In an analogous way as in the proof of Proposition 9.1 we show that
Proposition 9.2 Let uˆ ∈ U(x,y)(S, S) be the optimal strategy in the market with trans-
action costs with initial position (x, y). Assume there exists a shadow price (strong
shadow price) S˜, then the strategy uˆ is an optimal strategy in the frictionless market
with price process S˜.
One can notice that there is a clear difference between weak and strong shadow
prices. Weak shadow price is in fact a random field satisfying (i)–(iii) of Definition
9.1, while strong shadow price is just a sequence of random variables the choice of
which adjusted to the initial position at time 0.
We now formulate our main result of the paper
Theorem 9.1 Let the family Sˆ be defined by (8.12). Then Sˆ is a weak shadow price.
Furthermore, the optimal strategies in the market with shadow price are also optimal
in the original market with bid and ask prices.
Proof The proof is by backward induction. Our induction hypothesis Ik is the equality
vt (x, y, Sˆt (x, y, St , St )) = wt (x, y, St , St )
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for t ∈ {N −k, N −k+1, . . . , N } and (x, y) ∈ R2+ \{(0, 0)} and the fact that optimal
strategies in the markets with shadow price and bid and ask prices over time span {N −
k, N−k+1, . . . , N } coincide. First, consider the case k = 0. Let (x, y) ∈ R2+\{(0, 0)}
be our position. Clearly, the shadow price SˆN (x, y, SN , SN ) = SN because at time
moment N it is optimal to sell all assets. For (x, y) ∈ R2+ \ {(0, 0)} we have
vN (x, y, SˆN (x, y, SN , SN )) = g(x + SˆN (x, y, SN , SN )y) =
g(x + SN y) = wN (x, y, SN , SN ).
Therefore for k = 0 the hypothesis I0 is satisfied. Assume it also holds for k ≤ n − 1.
Then for (x, y) ∈ R2+ \ {(0, 0)} we have that
vN−n+1(x, y, SˆN−n+1(x, y, SN−n+1, SN−n+1)) =
wN−n+1(x, y, SN−n+1, SN−n+1). (9.2)
Since by Bellman equation




γwN−n+1(x − c + SˆN−n(x, y, SN−n, SN−n)(m − l), y − m + l,
SˆN−n+1(x − c + SˆN−n(x, y, SN−n, SN−n)(m − l),
y − m + l, SN−n+1, SN−n+1)|FN−n],
using (9.2) we obtain




γwN−n+1(x − c + SˆN−n(x, y, SN−n, SN−n) · (m − l),
y − m + l, SN−n+1, SN−n+1)|FN−n],
which coincides with vN−n defined in (5.2). By Theorem 8.1 we obtain In . unionsq
Notice that
Corollary 9.1 Let Sˆ be defined by (8.12). For each (x, y, s, s) ∈ D and for every
k ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , N } we have that




γ vN−k+1(x − c + SˆN−k(x, y, s, s) · (m − l), y − m + l,
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SˆN−k+1(x − c + SˆN−k(x, y, s, s) · (m − l),
y − m + l, SN−k+1, SN−k+1))|FN−k] =
wN−k(x, y, s, s). (9.3)
In the next Theorem we prove the existence of strong shadow price and we show
the connection between strong and weak shadow prices.
Theorem 9.2 If uˆ ∈ U(x,y)(S, S) is the optimal strategy in the market with transac-
tion costs with initial position (x, y) and (xˆn, yˆn)Nn=0 are the corresponding market
positions then there exists a strong shadow price S˜ = (S˜n)Nn=0 which is of the the form
Sˆn(xˆn, yˆn, Sn, Sn) = S˜n . (9.4)
for n ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , N }, where Sˆ is a weak shadow price.
Proof Notice first that for n ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1} we have
wn(xˆn, yˆn, Sn, Sn) = E[g(cˆn) + wn+1(xˆn+1, yˆn+1, Sn+1, Sn+1)|Fn], (9.5)
where cˆn is the corresponding to uˆ optimal consumption.
For (x, y, s˜) ∈ Dˆ let
v˜N (x, y, s˜) := g(x + s˜ y),
and for k ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , N } let
v˜N−k(x, y, s˜) := sup
(c,l,m)∈B(x,y,s˜)
E[g(c)+
γ v˜N−k+1(x − c + s˜ · (m − l), y − m + l, S˜N−k+1)|FN−k]. (9.6)
Clearly
wN (xˆN , yˆN , SN , SN ) = v˜N (xˆN , yˆN , S˜N ) = vN (xˆN , yˆN , SˆN (xˆN , yˆN , SN , SN )).
(9.7)
By Theorem 8.1 and (8.13) we have that
vN−1(xˆN−1, yˆN−1, SˆN−1(xˆN−1, yˆN−1, SN−1, SN−1))
= wN−1(xˆN−1, yˆN−1, SN−1, SN−1) (9.8)
and therefore by (9.6)
wN−1(xˆN−1, yˆN−1, SN−1, SN−1) = v˜N−1(xˆN−1, yˆN−1, S˜N−1). (9.9)
Assume now that for k ∈ {2, . . . , N }
wN−k+1(xˆN−k+1,yˆN−k+1, SN−k+1, SN−k+1) =
v˜N−k+1(xˆN−k+1, yˆN−k+1, S˜N−k+1). (9.10)
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By (8.13) we have again that
vN−k(xˆN−k,yˆN−k, SˆN−k(xˆN−k, yˆN−k, SN−k, SN−k)) =
wN−k(xˆN−k, yˆN−k, SN−k, SN−k) (9.11)
and therefore by (9.10) and (9.6) we have that
wN−k(xˆN−k, yˆN−k, SN−k, SN−k) = v˜N−k(xˆN−k, yˆN−k, S˜N−k). (9.12)
Consequently w0(x, y, S, S) = v˜0(x, y, S˜0) which means that (S˜n)Nn=0 is a strong
shadow price. This ends the proof. unionsq
10 Examples
In this section we show two examples for which the results presented in the paper can
be applied. The first example concerns so calledMarkov pricemodel considered in [3].
Let ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, . . . , ξN be a sequence of independent and identically distributed random
variables such that suppξ1 = [−1,∞). Moreover let Fn := σ(ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, . . . , ξn) for
n ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , N } and
Sn := S0 · (1 + ξ1) · (1 + ξ2) · (1 + ξ3) · · · · · (1 + ξn), (10.1)
where S0 > 0 is a fixed constant. Define bid and ask prices
Sn := (1 − μ)Sn and Sn := (1 + λ)Sn . (10.2)
for n ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , N } with constants μ ∈ [0, 1) and λ ∈ [0,∞).




γ n ln cn (10.3)
in the market with the bid and ask price processes S and S given by (10.1) and (10.2).
By (3.1) and (3.6) the sequence of Bellman equations corresponding to above
problem is of the form
wN (x, y, (1 − μ)s, (1 + λ)s) = ln(x + (1 − μ)sy)
and
wN−k(x, y, (1 − μ)s, (1 + λ)s) :=
= sup
(c,l,m)∈A(x,y,(1−μ)s,(1+λ)s)
E[ln c + γwN−k+1(x − c + (1 − μ)sm − (1 + λ)sl,
y − m + l, (1 − μ)s(1 + ξN−k+1), (1 + λ)s(1 + ξN−k+1))] (10.4)
for (x, y, s) ∈ Dˆ and k ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , N }.
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Moreover, by Corollary 3.3 for all (x, y, s) ∈ Dˆ and for all k ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , N }
there exists a unique
(cN−k(x, y, s), lN−k(x, y, s),mN−k(x, y, s)) ∈ R3+ (10.5)
for which supremum in (10.4) is attained.
From Sect. 6 by (6.1) we have
vN−k(x, y, sˆ) =
= sup
(c,b)∈[0,x+sˆ y]×[0,1]
E[ln c + γwN−k+1((1 − b)(x + sˆ y − c),
b(x + sˆ y − c)
sˆ
, SN−k+1, SN−k+1)|FN−k], (10.6)
where (x, y, sˆ) ∈ Dˆ and k ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , N }. By the properties of logarithm (see
(6.3)) we get that the optimal consumption in (10.6) is given by the formula
cˆN−k(x, y, sˆ) := x + sˆ y
1 + γ + γ 2 + · · · + γ k . (10.7)
Let u ∈ U(x,y,(1−μ)S0,(1+λ)S0) be an optimal strategy in themarket with proportional
transaction costs. Clearly the sequence (cn(xn, yn, Sn))Nn=0 is uniquely determined.
From (10.7) there exists only one FN−k-measurable random variable S˜N−k such
that
cN−k(xN−k, yN−k, SN−k) = cˆN−k(xN−k, yN−k, S˜N−k .) (10.8)
Namely, from (10.8) we obtain that
S˜N−k = (1 + γ + γ
2 + · · · + γ k) · cN−k(xN−k, yN−k, SN−k) − xN−k
yN−k
(10.9)
The sequence (S˜n)Nn=0 given by (10.9) is the strong shadow price.
Note that the optimal one step strategy given by (10.5) after consumption can be
characterized from Lemma 3.3 by a cone NTN−k((1− μ)s, (1+ λ)s), which has the
following representation




(x + (1 − μ)smN−k(x, y, s) − (1 + λ)slN−k(x, y, s),
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Denote by
t N−k(s) := lN−k(1, 0, s)
1 − (1 + λ)slN−k(1, 0, s) (10.11)
and
t N−k(s) :=
1 − mN−k(0, 1, s)
(1 − μ)smN−k(0, 1, s) (10.12)
the slopes of lower and upper boundaries of NTN−k((1 − μ)s, (1 + λ)s). Note that
0 ≤ t N−k(s) ≤ t N−k(s) ≤ ∞.
Assume now that at the time moment N − k after consumption the investor has the
position (x, y) ∈ R2+ and the bid and ask prices are given by (1 − μ)s and (1 + λ)s
respectively, with s > 0. Then
(i) he does not trade if and only if t N−k(s) ≤ yx ≤ t N−k(s);
(ii) he sells some amount of stocks if and only if t N−k(s) <
y
x ;
(iii) he buys some amount of stocks if and only if yx < t N−k(s).
Moreover, from (10.8) we obtain that for each (x, y, s) ∈ Dˆ such that y > 0 there
exists a unique sˆN−k(x, y, s) ∈ [(1 − μ)s, (1 + λ)s] for which
cˆN−k(x, y, sˆN−k(x, y, s)) = cN−k(x, y, s) (10.13)
and
sˆN−k(x, y, s) = (1 + γ + γ




{Sˆn(x, y, (1 − μ)s, (1 + λ)s) : (x, y, s) ∈ Dˆ, n ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , N }} (10.15)
where Sˆn(x, y, (1 − μ)s, (1 + λ)s) := sˆn(x, y, s), forms a weak shadow price and
Sˆn(xn, yn, (1 − μ)Sn, (1 + λ)Sn) = S˜n, (10.16)
where S˜n is given by (10.9).
Another example concerns the case when Sn = exp {σ Xn + fn} where Xt is a
fractional Brownianmotionwith Hurst parameter 0 < H < 1 and fn is a deterministic
sequence with the same cost functional (10.3). By Proposition 4.2 of [11] we have that
conditional full support condition is satisfied. Consequently expected values in (10.4)
and in (10.6) have to be replaced by conditional expectations and functions wN−k and
vN−k are random. The optimal strategies (10.5) are also random as well as the slopes
for lower and upper boundaries ofNTN−k((1−μ)s, (1+λ)s), which is again random.
Nevertheless (10.9) and (10.14) define strong and weak shadow prices.
Similar results we can also obtain for power utility function both for Markov and
fractional Brownian motion prices. The only problem is that we don’t have explicit
form for S˜N−k since we are not able to express sˆ as a function of cˆN−k from (6.6).
123
424 Appl Math Optim (2015) 72:391–433
Acknowledgments Lukasz Stettner research supported by NCN Grant DEC-2012/07/B/ST1/03298.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1 The only nontrivial property is compactness of the set
A(x, y, s, s). It is clear (see (2.2)) that A(x, y, s, s) is closed. Since m ≤ y + l
and x − c+ s(y + l)− sl ≥ 0 we then have l ≤ x−c+sys−s from which boundedness and
then compactness of A(x, y, s, s) follows and also we have (vi i). unionsq
Proof of Theorem 2.1 We show first that for every sequence (cn, ln,mn)∞n=1 such that
for n ∈ N we have (cn, ln,mn) ∈ A(xn, yn, sn, sn) we get
dist ((cn, ln,mn),A(x, y, s, s))
n→∞−−−→ 0. (A.1)
Assume that (A.1) does not hold. By compactness of the set cl(A(x, y, s, s) ∪ ∪∞n=1
A(xn, yn, sn, sn)) there is a subsequence (cnk , lnk ,mnk )
∞
k=1 converging to (c∗, l∗,m∗)
and a strictly positive ε such that
dist ((cnk , lnk ,mnk ),A(x, y, s, s)) > ε. (A.2)
Since 0 ≤ cnk ≤ xnk + snk ynk , 0 ≤ xnk − cnk + snkmnk − snk ynk , 0 ≤ ynk −mnk + lnk
and 0 ≤ mnk , lnk , letting k → ∞, we obtain 0 ≤ c∗ ≤ x + sy, 0 ≤ x − c∗ + s − sy,
0 ≤ y − m∗ + l∗, 0 ≤ m∗, l∗, which means that (c∗, l∗,m∗) ∈ A(x, y, s, s), which
contradicts (A.2) so that (A.1) follows.
We are going now to show that for any sequence (cn, ln,mn) taking values in
A(x, y, s, s) we have
dist ((cn, ln,mn),A(xn, yn, sn, sn)))
n→∞−−−→ 0. (A.3)
Assume that (A.3) does not hold. By compactness of A(x, y, s, s) there exists a
subsequence (cnk , lnk ,mnk ) from A(x, y, s, s) converging to some (c
∗, l∗,m∗) ∈
A(x, y, s, s) and a strictly positive ε such that for k ∈ N we have
dist ((cnk , lnk ,mnk ),A(xnk , ynk , snk , snk )) > ε. (A.4)
We shall show that there is a sequence (cnk , lnk ,mnk )
∞
k=1 taking values in
A(xnk , ynk , snk , snk ) and convergent to (c
∗, l∗,m∗), which will contradict (A.4). The
construction of such sequence or subsequence for simplicity denoted as (cnk , lnk ,mnk )
taking values in A(xnk , ynk , snk , snk )
∞
k=1 shall consist of several steps:
step 1. If c∗ ≥ xnk +snk ynk then letting k → ∞, we obtain c∗ ≥ x+sy. Therefore,
c∗ = x + sy, l = 0 and m = y and we let cnk := xnk + snk ynk , lnk := 0, mnk := ynk .
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step 2. If 0 < c∗ < xnk + snk ynk , for infinitely many k ∈ N, then
0 ≤ x − c∗ + sm∗ − sl∗ = xnk − c∗ + snkm∗ − snk l∗ + dnk
m∗ − l∗ ≤ ynk + bnk
with dnk := (x−xnk )+(s−snk )m∗+(snk −s)l∗ and bnk := y− ynk . Let l˜n := l∗+bn
and en := sn(l˜n − l∗). Clearly, dn, bn, en n→∞−−−→ 0 and m∗ − l˜nk ≤ ynk . We have four
cases:
case a) for infinitely many k ∈ N we have dnk < 0 and bnk ≤ 0. We can choose a
further subsequence to simplify notation denoted again by nk such that dnk < 0 and
bnk ≤ 0. As dnk < 0, then we have 0 ≤ xnk − c∗ + snkm∗ − snk l∗ + dnk < xnk − c∗ +
snkm
∗−snk l∗ and since bnk ≤ 0,we havem∗−l∗ ≤ ynk +bnk ≤ ynk . Therefore, taking
into account that 0 ≤ c∗ < xnk + snk ynk we obtain that (cnk , lnk ,mnk ) := (c∗, l∗,m∗)
takes values in A(xnk , ynk , snk , snk ), and it is a required sequence.
case b) for infinitely many k ∈ N we have dnk < 0 and bnk > 0 and as above we
consider further subsequence denoted again by nk such that dnk < 0 and bnk > 0.
Then 0 ≤ xnk − c∗ + snkm∗ − snk l∗ + dnk < xnk − (c∗ − enk ) + snkm∗ − snk l˜nk .
Since bnk > 0, we have l˜nk = l∗ + bnk > l∗ and consequently enk > 0. Moreover,
enk
k→∞−−−→ 0, and for k ∈ N sufficiently large 0 < c∗ − enk < xnk + snk ynk . Since
0 ≤ y−m∗+l∗ = ynk −m∗+l˜nk wehave that (c∗−enk , l˜nk ,m) ∈ A(xnk , ynk , snk , snk )
for k ∈ N sufficiently large and clearly (cnk , lnk ,mnk ) := (c∗ − enk , l˜nk ,m∗) k→∞−−−→
(c∗, l∗,m∗).
case c) for infinitely many k ∈ N we have dnk ≥ 0 and bnk ≤ 0 and we consider
further subsequence nk such that dnk ≥ 0 and bnk ≤ 0. Since (dnk )∞k=1 converges to
zero, for sufficiently large k ∈ Nwehave 0 < c∗−dnk ≤ c∗ < xnk +snk ynk .Moreover,
0 ≤ x − (c∗ − dnk ) + snkm∗ − snk l∗ and 0 ≤ y + l∗ −m∗ = ynk + bnk + l∗ −m∗ ≤
ynk + l∗ − m∗, which together means that (c∗ − dnk , l∗,m∗) ∈ A(xnk , ynk , snk , snk )
and (cnk , lnk ,mnk ) := (c∗ − dnk , l∗,m∗) k→∞−−−→ (c∗, l∗,m∗).
case d) for infinitely many k ∈ N we have dnk ≥ 0 and bnk > 0 and we consider
further subsequence denoted again by nk such that dnk ≥ 0 and bnk > 0.
We have 0 ≤ x − c∗ + sm∗ − sl∗ = xnk − (c∗ − dnk − enk ) + snkm∗ − snk l˜nk
and 0 ≤ y + l∗ − m∗ = ynk + l˜nk − m∗. Since sequences (dnk )∞k=1 and (enk )∞k=1
are nonnegative and converge to zero, then for k ∈ N sufficiently large we have
0 < c∗ − dnk − enk ≤ c∗ < xnk + snk ynk . This means that for k ∈ N sufficiently large
(c∗ − dnk − enk , l˜nk ,m∗) ∈ A(xnk , ynk , snk , snk ). Therefore, we let (cnk , lnk ,mnk ) :=
(c∗ − dnk − enk , l˜nk ,m∗) k→∞−−−→ (c∗, l∗,m∗).
step 3. If 0 = c∗ < xnk + snk ynk , we have two cases: either lim infk→∞(xnk +
snk ynk ) = 0 and then x + sy = 0 and x = y = c∗ = m∗ = l∗ = 0 and we let
(cnk , lnk ,mnk ) := (0, 0, 0) ∈ A(xnk , ynk , snk , snk ), or lim infk→∞(xnk + snk ynk ) >
0 = c∗. In the last case we have 0 < x + sy so that there is 0 < c∗n → 0 such that
(c∗n, l∗,m∗) ∈ A(x, y, s, s), which using step 2, can be approximated by elements of
A(xnk , ynk , snk , snk ). Since c
∗
n → 0, then we easily construct (cnk , lnk ,mnk ).
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Summarizing, we have (A.3) which together with (A.1) implies the convergence
(2.8). unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3.1 The proof is by induction in k = 1, 2, . . . , N . We show first
the case k = 1.
Fix (x, y) ∈ R2+ and (c, l,m) ∈ A(x, y, s, s). Assume the sequence (xn, yn, cn,
ln,mn)∞n=1 is such that for n ∈ N we have (xn, yn) ∈ R2+ and (cn, ln,mn) ∈
A(xn, yn, s, s) and it converges to (x, y, c, l,m). Consider the following two cases.
1o. x − c + sm − sl ≥ 0 and y − m + l ≥ 0 and at least one of this inequalities is
strict.
From the convergence of the sequence (xn, yn, cn, ln,mn)∞n=1 we have that there
exist ε1 ≥ 0 and ε2 ≥ 0 such that ε1 + ε2 > 0 and for n ∈ N sufficiently large we
have xn − cn + smn − sln ≥ ε1 and yn − mn + ln ≥ ε2.
Let δ1 := supn∈N(xn − cn + smn − sln) and δ2 := supn∈N(yn −mn + ln). Clearly,
0 ≤ δ1, δ2 < ∞ and δ1 + δ2 > 0.
Consequently, for n ∈ N sufficiently large we have
wN (ε1, ε2, SN , SN ) ≤ wN (xn − cn + smn − sln,
yn − mn + ln, SN , SN ) ≤ wN (δ1, δ2, SN , SN ), (A.5)
because the random function wN (·, ·, SN , SN ) is strictly increasing with respect to
both variables.
Let
MN := max{|wN (ε1, ε2, SN , SN )|, |wN (δX , δY , SN , SN )|}.
From the integrability of wN (εX , εY , SN , SN ) and wN (δ
X , δY , SN , SN ) using
Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem we obtain
lim
n→∞ E[wN (xn − cn + smn − sln, yn − mn + ln, SN , SN )|FN−1] =
E[wN (x − c + sm − sl, y − m + l, SN , SN )|FN−1].
From the continuity of the function g : [0, x + sy] −→ R ∪ {−∞} we finally
obtain
lim
n→∞ E[VN−1(xn, yn, s, s, cn, ln,mn)|FN−1] = E[VN−1(x, y, s, s, c, l,m)|FN−1].
2o. x − c + sm − sl = 0 and y − m + l = 0.
In this case when g(0) is finite we use monotonicity argument as in the previous
case. Consider now the case of g(0) = −∞. In such case
wN (x − c + sm − sl, y − m + l, SN , SN ) = wN (0, 0, SN , SN ) = −∞.
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Since the sequence (cn)∞n=1 is bounded from above, we have that−∞ ≤ g(c) < ∞.
Therefore, VN−1(x, y, s, s, c, l,m) = −∞ and using our convention we have
E[VN−1(x, y, s, s, c, l,m)|FN−1] = −∞. (A.6)
It remains to show that
lim
n→∞ E[VN−1(xn, yn, s, s, cn, ln,mn)|FN−1] = −∞. (A.7)
It suffices to show that any sequence contains a subsequence which diverges to −∞.
If the sequences (xnk − cnk + smnk − slnk )∞k=1 and (ynk −mnk + lnk )∞k=1 are positive
and converge to x − c + sm − sl = 0 and y − m + l = 0 respectively, then there
exists subsequence (k j )∞j=1 such that the sequences (xnk j − cnk j + smnk j − slnk j )∞j=1,
(ynk j − mnk j + lnk j )∞j=1 and (cnk j ) are decreasing. Consequently the sequence
(VN−1(xnk j , ynk j , cnk j , lnk j ,mnk j , s, s))
∞∞j=1
j=1 is decreasing to−∞ and by Lebesgue’s
monotonic convergence theorem we obtain (A.7).
From Theorems 2.1 and 10.1 we get that random function wN−1(·, ·, s, s) is con-
tinuous.
In the case of k > 1 we assume continuity wN−k+1 and then show similarly as in
the case k = 1 the continuity of the mapping
(x, y, c, l,m) −→ E[VN−k(x, y, s, s, c, l,m)|FN−k]
for (x, y) ∈ R2+ and (c, l,m) ∈ A(x, y, s, s), taking into account required by (A1)
integrability of wN−k+1(x, y, SN−k+1, SN−k+1). The continuity of wN−k follows
then from Theorems 2.1 and 10.1.
This completes the proof. unionsq
Proof of Lemma 3.1 From the continuity of the random function
E[VN−k(x, y, s, s, ·, ·, ·)|FN−k]
we get that for ω ∈  we have
wN−k(x, y, s, s)(ω) =
sup
(c,l,m)∈A(x,y,s,s)∩Q3
E[VN−k(x, y, s, s, c, l,m)|FN−k](ω)
where Q stays for rationals. Let (cn, ln,mn)∞n=0 be the set of all elements of
A(x, y, s, s) ∩ Q3. Define the sequence of (cˆn, lˆn, mˆn)∞n=0 of FN−k-measurable
random variables taking values in A(x, y, s, s) ∩ Q3 in the following way. Let
(cˆ0, lˆ0, mˆ0) := (c0, l0,m0),
A1 := {E[VN−k(x, y, s, s, c1, l1,m1)|FN−k] ≥
E[VN−k(x, y, s, s, cˆ0, lˆ0, mˆ0)|FN−k]}
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and
(cˆ1, lˆ1, mˆ1) := (c1, l1,m1)1(A1) + (cˆ0, lˆ0, mˆ0)1( \ A1)
Then we define inductively
An+1 := {E[VN−k(x, y, s, s, cn+1, ln+1,mn+1)|FN−k] ≥
E[VN−k(x, y, s, s, cˆn, lˆn, mˆn)|FN−k]}
and
(cˆn+1, lˆn+1, mˆn+1) := (cn+1, ln+1,mn+1)1(An+1) + (cˆn, lˆn, mˆn)1( \ An+1)
Directly from the construction we have that
E[VN−k(x, y, s, s, cˆn+1, lˆn+1, mˆn+1)|FN−k] ≥
E[VN−k(x, y, s, s, cˆn, lˆn, mˆn)|FN−k] (A.8)
and
E[VN−k(x, y, s, s, cˆn+1, lˆn+1, mˆn+1)|FN−k] ≥
E[VN−k(x, y, s, s, cn, ln,mn)|FN−k]
for n = 0, 1 . . . Therefore, for ω ∈  we have
wN−k(x, y, s, s)(ω) = lim
n→∞ E[VN−k(x, y, s, s, cˆn+1, lˆn+1, mˆn+1)|FN−k](ω).
(A.9)
By Lemma 2 of [14] there is a random FN−k-measurable subsequence (nk)∞n=1 of N
and FN−k - measurable random variable (cˆ, lˆ, mˆ) taking values in the set A(x, y, s, s)
such that for each ω ∈ 
lim
k→∞(cˆ1+nk (ω)(ω), lˆ1+nk (ω)(ω), mˆ1+nk (ω)(ω)) = (cˆ(ω), lˆ(ω), mˆ(ω)).
Letting subsequence nk → ∞ in (A.9) taking into account (A.8) and assumption (A1)
by continuity of the mapping
(c, l,m) → E[VN−k(x, y, s, s, c, l,m)|FN−k]
we obtain (3.7), which completes the proof. unionsq
Theorem 10.1 Let (X, d) be a metric space and let the mapping x −→ A(x) be
compact valued continuous in Hausdorff metric. Assume the function β : X × X −→
123
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R, where R stands for R∪{−∞,+∞}, is continuous. Then the function ϕ : X −→ R





Proof Fix x ∈ X . Assume the sequence (xn)∞n=1 from X converges to x . We shall
prove that ϕ(xn)
n→∞−−−→ ϕ(x).
For n ∈ N let yn ∈ A(xn) be such that
ϕ(xn) = sup
y∈A(xn)
β(xn, y) = β(xn, yn).
Since the sequence (xn)∞n=1 is convergent, then the set cl(∪∞n=1A(xn) ∪ A(x)) is
compact. Consequently there exists a subsequence (ynk )
∞
k=1 of (yn)∞n=1 which con-
verges to some y∗ ∈ cl(∪∞n=1A(xn)∪A(x)). Clearly y∗ ∈ A(x), since A(xnk )
k→∞−−−→
A(x) in Hausdorff metric. Furthermore, every convergent subsequence (ynk )∞k=1 of
(yn)∞n=1 converges to an element of A(x). Therefore,
ϕ(xnk ) = β(xnk , ynk ) k→∞−−−→ β(x, y∗) ≤ sup
y∈A(x)
β(x, y) = ϕ(x).
Since this holds for any convergent subsequence (ynk )
∞
k=1 of (yn)∞n=1, then we have
lim inf
n→∞ ϕ(xn) ≤ lim supn→∞ ϕ(xn) ≤ ϕ(x). (A.11)
Let now y ∈ A(x) be such that ϕ(x) = β(x, y). From the convergence
A(xn) n→∞−−−→ A(x) in Hausdorff metric there exists a sequence (yn)∞n=1 convergent
to y and such that yn ∈ A(xn) for n ∈ N. Thus,
ϕ(xn) = sup
y∈A(xn)
β(xn, y) ≥ β(xn, yn) n→∞−−−→ β(x, y) = ϕ(x).
This means that
ϕ(x) ≤ lim inf
n→∞ ϕ(xn) ≤ lim supn→∞ ϕ(xn). (A.12)
From (A.11) and (A.12) we obtain that
ϕ(x) ≤ lim inf
n→∞ ϕ(xn) ≤ lim supn→∞ ϕ(xn) ≤ ϕ(x),
i.e. ϕ(x) = limn→∞ ϕ(xn) and the function ϕ is continuous. unionsq
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Theorem 10.2 Let (X, d) be a linear metric space and for each x ∈ X let C(x) ⊆ X
be a compact and convex set. Assume the function β : X × X → R is continuous
and such that for x ∈ X the mapping β(x, ·) : C(x) → R is strictly concave. Let the




for x ∈ X. If the mapping x −→ C(x) is continuous in Hausdorff metric, then for
every x ∈ X there exists a unique cˆ(x) ∈ C(x) such that
ϕ(x) := sup
c∈C(x)
β(x, c) = β(x, cˆ(x)). (A.14)
Furthermore, the mapping x −→ cˆ(x) satisfying (A.14) is continuous.
Proof ByTheorem 10.1, from the continuity of themapping β we get the continuity of
ϕ. We will prove first that for every x ∈ X there exists only one cˆ(x) ∈ C(x) satisfying
(A.14). Assume this is not true. Then there exist x ∈ X and cˆ1(x), cˆ2(x) ∈ C(x) such
that cˆ1(x) = cˆ2(x) and
ϕ(x) := sup
c∈C(x)
β(x, c) = β(x, cˆ1(x)) = β(x, cˆ2(x)).
By strict concavity of β(x, ·) : C(x) −→ R and convexity of the set C(x), for every
t ∈ (0, 1) we have t cˆ1(x) + (1 − t)cˆ2(x) ∈ C(x) and
ϕ(x) = sup
c∈C(x)
β(x, c) ≥ β(x, t cˆ1(x) + (1 − t)cˆ2(x)) >
tβ(x, cˆ1(x)) + (1 − t)β(x, cˆ2(x)) = ϕ(x),
which is a contradiction. Consequently for every x ∈ X there exists a unique cˆ(x) ∈
C(x) satisfying (A.14).
We will show now that the mapping x −→ cˆ(x) is continuous. Fix x ∈ X and
assume the sequence (xn)∞n=1 converges to x . Since cl(∪∞n=1C(xn)∪ C(x)) is compact
there exists a subsequence (nk)∞k=1 such that the sequence (cˆ(xnk ))∞k=1 converges to
some c˜ ∈ C(x). By continuity of ϕ and β, we have
ϕ(x) = lim
k→∞ ϕ(xnk ) = limk→∞ β(xnk , cˆ(xnk )) = β(x, c˜).
As ϕ(x) = β(x, cˆ(x)) and cˆ(x) is uniquely determined, we have c˜ = cˆ(x). Since it
holds for every convergent subsequence of (cˆ(xnk ))
∞
k=1, then the mapping x −→ cˆ(x)
is continuous.
Below we present a sufficient condition for the condition (A1) to be satisfied.
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x + SN−n y







1 · . . . · Sσ(N )N
Sτ(1)1 · . . . · Sτ(N )N
< ∞, (A.16)
for any sequences (σ (1), . . . , σ (N )) and (τ (1), . . . , τ (N )) taking values in the set
{0, 1} then the condition (A1) is satisfied.
Proof First, note that for every (x, y) ∈ R2+ \ {(0, 0)} and s, s ∈ R+ such that







N − k + 1
)
≤ wN−k(x, y, s, s) (A.17)
for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N . It is a consequence of the following fact: the strategy such
that at time moment N − k we sell all our stocks and in the future we do not buy
stocks and at time moments N − k, N − k + 1, . . . , N we consume the fixed amount
x+sy
N−k+1 is an admissible strategy. Thus, indeed, (A.17) holds and consequently for
k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N
∀(x,y)∈R2+\{(0,0)} E[wN−k(x, y, SN−k, SN−k)]
− < ∞. (A.18)
Note that from the fact that for u > 0 we have ln u ≤ 1 + u and uα ≤ 1 + u
we get that for every random variable S which takes values in the interval [0,∞) the
integrability of (1 + S) implies the integrability of g(S)+.
Note also that for (x, y) ∈ R2+ \ {(0, 0)} and s, s ∈ R+ such that s > s > 0 the
following inequalities hold
c ≤ x + sy,
x − c + sm − sl ≤ x + sy,
y − m + l ≤ y + x
s
for (c, l,m) ∈ A(x, y, s, s).
Define the sequence (FN−k(·, ·))Nk=0 of random functions from R2+ to R+ induc-
tively in the following way. Let FN (x, y) := 1+ x + SN y and for k = 1, 2, 3, . . . , N
let
FN−k(x, y) := 1 + x + SN−k y + γ FN−k+1
(






432 Appl Math Optim (2015) 72:391–433
Clearly the following implication holds
(∀k=0,1,2,...,N∀(x,y)∈R2+E[FN−k(x, y)]
+ < ∞) ⇒
⇒(∀k=0,1,2,...,N∀(x,y)∈R2+E[wN−k(x, y, SN−k, SN−k)]
+ < ∞). (A.20)
From the fact that for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N we have 0 < SN−k < SN−k and from the
construction of the sequence (FN−k(·, ·))Nk=0 of random functions taking into account
(A.16) we obtain
∀k=0,1,2,...,N∀(x,y)∈R2+E[FN−k(x, y)]
+ < ∞ (A.21)
which completes the proof. unionsq
Below we formulate two simple lemmas without proofs.
Lemma 10.2 Let x, a > 0 and for c ∈ [0, x]
G(c) := ln c + a ln(x − c).
Then supc∈[0,x] G(c) = G(cˆ), where cˆ = x1+a .
Lemma 10.3 Let x, a > 0 and for c ∈ [0, x]
F(c) := cα + a(x − c)α,
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